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common law is, of course, indisputable. But likewise it should
be added that appellant county's maintenance of the present
action is not inconsistent with this settled principle, sinc.e in
our opinion its action based upon the reimbursement theory
is expressly authorized by section 2576 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, as above construed. The fallacy of respondent's argument is her assumption that sections 2576-2578
contemplate not two types of action, but only one method of
procedure, the filing of a petition for and the securing of a
court order judicially declaring the responsibility of the
specified kindred as a prerequisite to the county's commencement of a suit for the recovery of money expended in aid of
the indigent relation. The fact that respondent as defendant
in the county's action for reimbursement was furnished with
notice of suit and afforded an opportunity to present her case
in court satisfies the requirements of due process of law. This
precise point was recently so determined in the E~tate of
Stobie, 30 Cal. App. (2d) 525, 529-530 [86 Pac. (2d) 883],
wherein the state was suing for reimbursement for the care
furnished an insane person under a statute making the estate
of the incompetent liable.
Furthermore, with respect to the estate's liability upon
the county's claim, it should be noted that section 573 of the
Probate Code specifically provides for the survival of an
action such· as the instant one, which "might have been maintained" against the deceased during her lifetime.
For the reasons above expressed it is our opinion that the
county's amended complaint herein states a cause of action
under the provisions of section 2576 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Accordingly, the judgment from which this
appeal was taken is reversed, with directions to the trial court
to overrule the demurrer and permit the respondent to
answer if she so desire.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Houser, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 18116. In Bank.
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MYRTLE NEEL, Appellant, v. MANNINGS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.
'
[1] Judgments-Form and Requisites--Oonformity to Pleadings,
etc.-Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto-Exercise of Power.
-Inasmuch as the power to set aside a verdict and enter a
contrary judgment is the same as the power to grant a non- '
suit, a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict may be
granted when, and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence,and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which
it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference,
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of"sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
[2a-2c] Negligence-Actions-Evidence - Weight and Sufficiency
-Stairway-Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.-In an action
for head injury sustained by a customer as the result of striking a ceiling board while ascending a stairway, it was error
to render a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff where from the testimony as to the construction of the stairway and as to good architectural practice requiring projecting handrails the full length of the stairway, the jury might reasonably have inferred that the injury
resulted from the unsafe condition of the stnirway, where the
jury viewed the premises and the knowledge gained may have
had much to do with their determination of the issue, and
where the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
[3] Id.-Oare Toward Particular Persons-Invitees - Duty Toward.-The law imposes upon a storekeeper the duty of exer·..
cising ordinary care and prudence to keep the aisles and passageways of the premises, in and through which by their locaMcK. Dig. References: [lJ Judgments, § 113 (1); [2] Negligence, § 146; [3] Negligence,§ 73; [4] Evidence, § 459; [5] Trial,
§ 63; [6, 8] Negligence, § 25; [7] Negligence, § 24; [9] Negligence,
§ 44 (3); [10] Negligence, § 170.
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cation and arrangement a customer in making purchases' is induced to go, in a reasonably safe condition so as not unnecessarily to expose him to danger or accident.
[4] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Weight-Expert Opinion.-Expert evidence is to be given the weight to which it appears
in each case to be justly"entitled, and the law makes no distinction between that kind of testimony and evidence of other
character. The province of such opinion testimony is only to
aid in coming to a conclusion, and it does not exclude consideration of other evidence which is pertinent to the issue
involved.
[5] Trial-Custody, etc., of Jury - View - As Evidence.-The
knowledge gained by a jury on a view of the premises is independent evidence in the case.
[6] Negligence-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger-Constructive N otice.-Where the construction of a stairway on
demised premises has remained unchanged during the ten-year
period of a tenant's o'ccupancy, he is deemed to have constructive notice of its condition.

[7] ld.-Exercise of Care-Usage or Custom.-The construction
of premises in conformity with the generally approved standard and usual building plan will not exonerate a defendant
unless such practice or custom was consistent with due care.
[8] ld.-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger-Ignorance of
Previous Accident.-The fact that a lessee had no knowledge
of any like accident having previously occurred on the premises does not repel a suggestion of negligence and preclude
inquiry as to whether it had performed its legal duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use
of patrons.
(9] ld.-Contributory Negligence-Forgetfulness of Known Danger.-Although an alleged defect in the construction of premises may have been patent and observable to anyone using
them, it was nevertheless a question for the jury whether it
was a want of ordinary. care not· to have kept in mind such
element of danger. Even forgetfulness of a known danger will
not operate to prevent a recovery, for to forget is not negli-

[4J See 10 Cal. Jur. 971, 974.
[5J See 24 Cal. Jur. 752.,
[6] Constructive notice of defective condition of leased premises, note, 25 A. L. R. 1295.
[7] See 19 Oal. Jur. 581.
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genceunless it shows a want of ordinary care. Generally the
question is for the ,jury.
[10] ld.-Trial-Quostions of Law and Fact-Contributory Negligcnce.-In an action for injury sustained by a restaurant customerwho struck her head against a ceiling board while
ascending a stairway, it was for the jury to determine from
the evidence before it whether it could reasonably be said
that the natural sway of plaintiff's body as her weight shifted
in moving on the stairway was sufficient to bring her in line
to strike her head on the edge of the ceiling bordering the
stairwell.

APPEAL from a' judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Harry R. Archbald, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for
the defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff
reversed with directions.
G. Revelle Harrison and AlbeIt E. Wheatcroft for Appellant.
Sidney .A.. Moss for Respondent.
CURTIS, J.-This is an action for damages for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she struck her head
against a ceiling board while ascending a stairway alleged to
have been negligently maintained by the defendant Mannings,
Inc. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in
the Sum of $1,500. Thereupon the defendant moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the ground that
the evidence not only failed to show that defendant was guilty
of negligence, but established the fact that the plaintiff's
injuries were the result of contributory negligence. The
motion was granted and from the judgment entered accordingly for defendant, plaintiff has appealed.
[1] It appears to be the well-established law of this state
that the power of the trial court to set aside a verdict and
enter a contrary judgment is absolutely the same as its power
to grant a nonsuit. (Sec. 629, CodeCiv. Proc.; Card v. Boms,
210 Cal. 200 [291 Pac. 190] ; Hunt v. United Bank & Trust
Co. of California, 210 Cal. 108 [291 Pac. 184]; 7 Cal. Jur.
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la-Yr. Supp. 268, sec. 65c.) Therefore, a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto may properly he granted "when,
and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and giving to
plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled,
indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn
from that evidence, the result is a determination that there
is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff." (Card v. Roms, supra, at p. 202.)
[2a] In the light of this settled legal principle an examination
of the record in this case impels the conclusion that the trial
court was in error in determining that there was no evidence
which gave substantial support to the verdict rendered by
the jury.
The essential facts basis of the plaintiff's claim are briefly
as follows: For about ten years prior to May 2, 1939, the
date of plaintiff's accident, defendant Mannings, Inc., had
conducted a restaurant on the balcony of the Grand, Central
Public Market in Los Angeles. As the only public means of
access to this restaurant defendant maintained a stairway
of 14 steps, each approximately 714 inches high and 101;2
inches deep. The stairway was 44 inches wide and extended
from the ground floor of the market to the floor level of the
balcony. On each side of the lower half of the stairway was
a wall rail or banister approximately 30 inches above the
steps. As the stairs approached the level of the ceiling, the
open space between the ceiling and each wall rail became narrower. The ceiling did not extend over the stairwell except
at the bottom of the stairway, but it did extend over the wall
rails to each 'edge of the stairwell. The upper half of the
stairway was bordered on each side by solid walls, from which
handrails projected into the stairwell. From the lower part
of the stairway, because of the open space on either side
thereof, there could be seen various stalls located on the floor
of the market. '
At about noon on the day in question plaintiff and her
friend started abreast up the stairway for the purpose of
purchasing luncheon at' defendant '8 restaurant. After having so ascended a couple of steps and because of the presence
of other persons on the stairway, plaintiff's companion advanced to the left and ahead of plaintiff. The two ladies
proceeded in this position to mount the stairs until plaintiff
reached the fourth or fifth step, when plaintiff, who was then
about five or six inches from the wall' rail on the left side,
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moved further to the left to permit several people who were
descending the stairs to pass. At the same time she stepped
upward and struck her head on a sharp board on the edge of
the ceiling bordering the stairwell, thereby sustaining serious
injuries.
Plaintiff testified that she had used the' same stairway on
other occasions for a period of about fifteen years, during
none of which times she had struck her head against the
ceiling in question; that her eyesight was, good; that immediately prior to the happening of the accident she was looking
straight ahead as she moved up the stairs, and that when she
struck her head on the ceiling board upon stepping to the left
to allow other people coming toward her to pass, she grabbed
the skirt of her friend, who was walking just ahead and who
thereupon turned to assist plaintiff in her misfortune. Plaintiff's testimony as to the condition of the stairway with respect to the presence of other persons thereon and her action
following her injury was corroborated by plaintiff's friend,
who further stated that plaintiff complained that she had hit
her head and was in considerable pain. A qualified architect,
called as a witness by defendant, testified with reference to
approved, building standards for structures of the type in
question as follows: ' 'In my opinion these steps and stairway and that balcony with respect to its position to the
stairway were scientifically constructed. This stairway and
its surroundings are constructed in the manner approved
generally in the County of Los Angeles. In my opinion, this
construction of the stairway and the railing and the surrounding conditions are built in accordance with sound architectural practice. It is built in accord with the standard of
generally approved stairs of this type .... In a construction
such as involved in this case, where the edge of the ceiling is
on the same plane with the well' of the stairs or rail, if one
wished to operate a restaurant on that balcony to accommodate from, three to five hundred people I would not necessarily recommend that a rail projecting from the side of the
well be carried the full length of the stairway, but I would
so recommend on the basis of good architectural practice....
I would recommend that the projecting rail be carried the
full 1ength of the stairway merely as a continuous line of the
rail and not in order to prevent people from bumping their
heads in walking up." During the course of the trial plain-
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tiff moved that the jury visit the scene of the accident and
examine the stairway; and accordingly this was done. In connection with this inspection it was stipulated by the parties
that complete measurements as to dimensional facts and floor'plan arrangement of the stairway were correctly represented
by appropriate exhibits introduced in evidence,consisting of
several pictures and a diagram. There was also testimony
that defendant had no knowledge of any previous accident
having occurred on the stairway, and that about three or
four hundred people daily patronized its restaurant· on the
balcony.
[3] It should be noted at this point that there was no question before the jury as to the legal relationship existing between
the parties, for the defendant admitted in its answer that
plaintiff entered upon its premises as an invitee. The longrecognized rule governing such status is succinctly stated in
Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co., 51 Cal. App. 668, 670 [197
Pac. 427]: "One who, during business hours, lawfully enters
a store to purchase goods does so at the implied invitation of
the owner (Herzog v. Hemph~'ll, 7 Cal. App. 116 [93 Pac.
899]), upon whom the law imposes the duty of exercising
ordinary care and prudence to keep the aisles and passageways of the. premises, in and through which by their location
and arrangement a customer in making purchases is induced
to go, in a reasonably safe condition so as to not unnecessarily
expose him to danger or accident. (Hart v. Grennell, 122
N. Y. 371 [25 N. E. 354] ; Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565 [5
L. R. A. 580, 22 Pac. 256] ; Means v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co.,
144 Cal. 473 [1 Ann. Cas. 206, 77 Pac. 1001].)"
[2b] Under this condition of the evidence the questions presented to the jury for determination were: (1) whether de.fendant was negligent by reason of the manner in· which
it maintained the stairway; and if so, (2) whether its negligenco was the proximate cause of plaintiff's accident. The
jury's findings upon these questions entailed consideration
of the following matters: (3) whether plaintiff was negligent; and if so, (4) whether her negligence contributed to
her injuries. In deciding these issues, the jury was privileged
to consider the defendant's legal obligation to an invitee upon
its premises. That there was substantial evidence to support
the verdict in this case is apparent from the foregoing recital
of the record, when viewed in the light· most favorable to
plaintiff and without regard for any asserted contradictions

NEEL

v.

MANNINGS, INC.

[19C. (2d) 647]

653

in the proof, as the rule requires the court to do in determining the ·propriety of a judgment non obstante veredicto.
Clearly tendered by the pleadings in this case and the basis·
of plaintiff's charge of negligence against defendant was the
issue as to the dangerous and defective condition of the stairs
leading to the restaurant on the balcony. Bearing upon this
question at the trial was the following evidence: the testimony of plaintiff and her companion as to the general physical aspect of the stairway and their use of it at the time
of the accident; the pictures and diagram showing the dimensional facts with respect to the steps and the surrounding
premises, and revealing that the edge of the ceiling was on
the same line or plane as the inside edge of each of the wall
rails located on the lower half of the stairway; and the statement of the architect (on cross-examination) that goodarchitedural practice would require a full-length projecting handrail on each side of the stairway. From these evidentiary
factors the jury might reasonably have inferred that the
plaintiff, in ascending the steps in the manner presumably
contemplated by the defendant, was injured by reason of an
unsafe condition associated with the stairway, such as the
absence of a continuous projecting handrail along the entire
length of each side of the staircase to keep a patron's body
clear of the wall rails and edge of the ceiling, or the presence
of the wall rails on the lower portion of the stairway inviting
a customer to assume a position close to the side of the stairs
in allowing others to pass thereon and thus be apt to strike
the border of the ceiling in progressing on the way to the
restaurant. Or the jury might have concluded that the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to eliminate the
danger of injury as described herein, should have walled in
each side of the lower half of the stairway as was done on
the upper part thereof. It is true that the architect stated
(on direct examination) that the stairway was "scientifically
constructed" in the generally approved manner and (on redirect examination) that his recommendation with respect to
the desirability of the full-length projecting handrail related
to "good architectural practice' , in the sense of aesthetic
considerations of beauty and continuity. of line rather that in
deference to safety principles. But the jury was privileged
to reject this testimony as inconsistent with the positive statement elicited in the course of cross-examination of this witness
and reasonably referable without qualification to the safety'
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features of the premises whereon plaintiff claimed to have
suffered injuries, that in the given circumstances he would
"recommend that a rail projecting from the side of the well
be carried the full length of the stairway ... on the basis of good
architectural practice." [4] Expert testimony is to be given
the weight to which it appears in each case to be justly entitled, and the law makes no distinction' between that kind
of testimony and evidence of other character. The province'
of such opinion testimony is only to aid in coming to a conclusion, and it does not exclude consideration of other evidence which is pertinent to the issue involved. (10 Cal. Jur.
971, sec. 228; 974, sec. 232 ; State Oompensation Ins. Fund
v. Industrial Accident Oommission, 195' Cal. 174 [231 Pac.
996]; Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243 [228 Pac. 25];
Rolland v. Porterfield, 183 Cal. 466 [191 Pac. 913].) This
principle is particularly applicable in the present case when it
is remembered that the jury made an inspection of the defendant's premises and observed the pitch or grade of the stairway
in relation to the edge of the ceiling bordering the stairwell,
the wall rails and handrails in their respective positions, and
the probability or likelihood of one striking his head in the
fashion' above described when ascending the steps in an ordinary manner. [5] The knowledge acquired by this visit to the
scene of the accident, supplementing the information embodied in the above-mentioned exhibits relative to the dimensional facts as to the construction of the stairway, was independent evidenc·e in the case, and undoubtedly it had much
to do with the jury's determination of this issue in accord
with the plaintiff's claim. (24 Cal. Jur. 752, sec. 34; Etltel
D. 00. v. Industrial .Ace. Oom., 219 Cal. 699, 704 [28 Pac.
(2d) 919]; MacPherson v. West Ooast Transit 00., 94 Cal.
App. 463, 466 [271 Pac. 509]; Vaughan v. Oounty of
Tulare, 56 Cal. App. 261, 265 [205 Pac. 21].) [2c] Whether the
stairway as maintained by the defendant was unsafe and dangerous for the use for which it was intended and to which
it was put was a question peculiarly proper for submission
to the arbitrament of the jury. (Oles v. Kahn Bros., 81 Cal.
App. 76, 83 [253 Pac. 158] ; Long v. John Breuner 00., 36
Cal. App. 630, 634 [172 Pac. 1132].)
[6] Following its finding that the premises were dangerous
and unsafe in the respect alleged by plaintiff, the jury was required to determine whether the defendant was chargeable
with knowledge of this condition. Although there was no
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evidence that defendant had actual notiee of the defective
character of the stairway, the undisputed fact that the construction .of the stairs and the relation of the balcony thereto
had remained unchanged during the ten-year period of defendant's tenancy was sufficient to constitute constructive
notice to defendant of the condition found to exist by the
jury. (Papineau v. Distributors Packing Go., lOCal. App.
(2d) 558 [52 Pac. (2d) 571] ;1 Boothby v. Town of Yreka Oity,
117
1295.)Cal. App. 643 [4 Pac. (2d) 589]; Note 25 A. L. R.

[7] The testimony of the architect that the stairway was
constructed in conformity with generally approved standards
and usual building plans for that type of structure would
not serve to absolve defendant from the charge of negligence.
The general practice or custom would not exonerate defendant
unless such practice or custom was consistent with due care.
(19 Cal. Jur. 581, sec. 25; Mehollin v. Ysuchiyama, 11 Cal.
(2d) 53, 57 [77 Pac. (2d) 855]; Robinet v. Hawks, 200 Cal.
265, 274 [252 Pac. 1045); Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn.,
172 Cal. 311, 315 [156 Pac. 449}.) [8] Nor did the showing
that defendant had no knowledge of any like accident having
previously occurred on the stairway repel the suggestion of
negligence and preclude inquiry as to Whether it had performed its legal duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the Use of its patrons. This circumstance does not negative the possibility that many another
person in ascending the stairs to the restaurant may have
struck his head against the ceiling as plaintiff claimed she
did, but because of slight injury and only temporary pain,
no complaint was made. Furthermore, if this absence of report of prior mishaps had the effect urged by defendant, it
would furnish a· perfect defens-e, however dangerous and unsafe the stairway might appear to be, as shown by other
evidence. (Sander v. Los Angeles By. Gorp., 38 Cal. App.
222, 230 [175 Pac. 901].)
[9] The next question to be considered is whether plaintiff
was as a matter of law guilty of contributory negligence.
In this regard defendant relies on the rule that where one
knows a condition to be dangerous and is injured because of
failure to take heed thereof, such conduct will bar a reCOvery.
But even though the evidence did establish that the alleged
defect in the construction of defendant's premises was patent
and observable to anyone using the stairway, and that ill
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addition plaintiff by reason of her past visits to the restaurant was familiar with the exiRting condition, there would still
be the question for the determination of the jury as to whether
or not it was a want of ordinary care on the part of plaintiff
not to have kept in mind such element of danger when stepping toward the wall rail to allow other persons descending
the stairs to pass. (Meindersee v. Meyers, 188 Cal. 498, 503
[205 Pac. 1078]; Oles v. Kahn Bros., 81 Cal. App. 76, 82
[253 Pac. 158] ; Hayward v. Downer, 65 Cal. App. 450, 451
[224 Pac. 265].) Even forgetfulness of a known danger will
not operate to prevent a recovery, for to forget is not negligence unless it shows a want of ordinary care. Generally the
question is one for the jury ( Gibson v. Coun'ty of Mendocino,
16 Cal. (2d) 80, 89 [105 Pac. (2d) 105] ; Smith v. Southern
Pacific Co., 201 Cal. 57, 69-70 [255 Pac. 500] ; Meindersee v.
Myers, 188 Cal. 498, 503 [205 Pac. 1078] ; Roseberry v. Edward F. Niehatts & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [137 Pac. 232] ;
McStay v. Citizens Nat. T. & S. Bank, 5 CaL App. (2d) 595,
600 [43 Pac. (2d) 560]; Rosella v. Paxinos, 110 Cal. App.
299, 302 [294 Pac. 39]), and the record in the present case
demonstrates that it comes well within this settled principle.
Plaintiff's act in stepping toward the left wall rail to permit
several persons approaching her from the opposite direction
to pass diverted her from her normal course of progress up
the stairs, which line of travel had been five or six inches
distant from this mentioned banister. In so doing her attention was distracted by her effort to avoid collision with these
other people, and she momentarily did not observe or remember the dangerous condition incident to the proximity
of the edge of the ceiling bordering the stairwell. Whether
plaintiff's action was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances was for the jury to decide as an issue of fact.
(Smith v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, and cases there cited
at pp. 69-70.) As was said in McStay v. Citizens Nat. T. &;
S. Bank, S1,tpra, at p. 600: "Wh~re different conclusions may
be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same evidence, the decision must be left to the jury. "
[10] Defendant's further contention on this phase of the
case, that the accident would not have happened if plaintiff had
not protruded her head beyond the space occupied by the
stairwell and proceeded up the stairs in that position without
looking, is purely argumentative and has no evidentiary
foundation in the record. Plaintiff testified that she was posi-
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tive that she was not leaning over to the left, but was standing
erect when she "stepped up and over to her left and then
struck her head." Her version of the accident does not
appear to be inconsistent with the admitted physical facts
relative to the construction of the stairway, and it was for
the jury to determine from the evidence before it whether it
could reasonably be said that the natural sway of plaintiff's
body as her weight shifted in so moving on the stairs was
, sufficient to bring her in'line to strike her head on the edge
of the ceiling bordering the stairwell. (N eilson v. Houle, 200
Cal. 726, 728 [254 Pac. 891] ; Parker v. Manchester Hotel Co.,
29 Cal. App.(2d) 446, 456 [85 Pac. (2d) 152].)
Tested by the foregoing considerations, it is manifest that
the jury, as the basis of its verdict in favor of plaintiff, was
warranted in concluding that defendant, by reason of its
maintenance of the stairway in the condition above described,
breached its legal duty to plaintiff to keep its premises reasonably safe, and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, the judgment is
reversed and the trial court is hereby directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,500 pursuant
to the verdict of the jury rendered in this action.
Shenk, J., Houser, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., dissenting.-I dissent.
To recover damages for negligence the plaintiff must estab~
lish that her injuries were caused by the breach of a duty
owed to her by defendant. ' The occupant of premises open
to business visitors is not an insurer of a visitor's safety and
need not eliminate every condition that might conceivably
cause injury. He is liable only for injuries caused by conditions, of which he knows or should know, that constitute an
unreasonable risk to visitors, when he fails to give them adequate warning. (Rest. Torts, sec. 343; Prosser, Torts, sec. 79,
p. 642; 19 Cal. Jur. 618, 622; 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 349, 350, 353,
354, 1011-1012.)
,
In the present case there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that the condition of the stairs subjected
visitors to an unreasonable risk. According to the testimony
of the architect, the stairs were scientifically constructed in
the generally approved manner. While he recommended that
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a hand rail projecting from the side of the well be carried the
full length of the stairway, he made it clear that this was
desirable merely to form a continuous line and not to prevent
people from bumping their heads in walking up the stairs.
His statement affords no basis for concluding that the stairway subjected visitors to unreasonable risk. The fact that
the jury viewed the premises is not sufficient to support a
finding of negligence, particularly since the parties stipulated
that what was viewed by the jury is presented in the exhibits.
These exhibits picture a normal, unobstructed stairway, and
contain no evidence· of unreasonable risk to visitors.
If there is a defective condition in the premises the occupant may discharge his duty to business visitors by giving
them adequate warning. (Rest. Torts, sec. 343; see cases cited
in Calif. Annotations to Rest. Torts, sec. 343; Prosser, Torts,
sec. 19, p. 642; 19 Cal. Jur. 618, 619; 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 349,
353, 354, 1011-1017.) If the danger is so apparent that the
visitor can reasonably be expected to notice it and protect
himself, the condition itself constitutes adequate warning, and
the possessor is under no obligation to take further action.
(Shanley v.American Olive 00., 185 Cal. 552 [197 Pac. 793] ;
Mautino v. Sutter Hospital 00., 211 Cal. 556 [296 Pac. 76] ;
Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas 00., 4 Cal. (2d) 511 [50 Pac. (2d)
801] ; Dingman v. A. F. Mattock 00., 15 Cal. (2d) 622 [104
Pac. (2d) 26] ; see cases cited in 8 Cal. Jur. Supp. 351, note 4,
p. 1012, note 4; Prosser, Torts, sec. 79, p. 642.) "There is
no liability for injuries from the dangers that are obvious, or
as well known to the person injured as to the owner or occupant." (Mootino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., supra, at p. 561.)
As stated in Shanley v.American Olive 00., supra, at p. 555:
, 'The responsibility of such owner for the safety of such person is not absolute; he is only required to use ordinary care
for the safety of the persons he invites to come upon the
premises. If there is a danger attending upon such entry,
or upon the work which the person invited is to do thereon,
and such danger arises from causes or conditions not readily
apparent to the eye, it is the duty of the owner to give such
person reasonable notice or warning of such danger. But
such owner is entitled to assume that such invitee will perceive that which would be obvious to him upon the ordinary
use of his own senses. He is not required to give to the invitee
notice or warning of an obvious danger."
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In the present case the evidence presented to the jury
establishes without question that the condition of the stairway
was apparent to any person using it and was as well known
to the plaintiff as to the defendant. There is no evidence
indicating that plaintiff did not have. adequate notice of the
condition of the stairway, and there is therefore no basis for
concluding that defendant violated any duty owed to plaintiff. The jUdgment of the trial court should be. affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March
30, 1942. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted
for a rehearing.

[L. A. No. 17182.
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